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Introduction 
Generational accounting is a new method for 
determining how government deficits, taxes, 
transfer payments, and other expenditures affect 
the distribution of income and wealth among 
different generations.The technique is still being 
developed, and a number of the assumptions 
used to estimate the accounts are controversial. 
Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotl~koff  (19911, 
Kotlikoff (19921, and Office of Management and 
Budget (1992) explain the basic concept and 
present some illustrative results. This article up- 
dates the baseline generational accounts report- 
ed in the 1993 federal budget and estimates the 
effects of several new alternative policies. It also 
extends the analysis for the first time to lifetime 
net tax rates-the  taxes that a generation pays, 
less the Social Security and other transfer bene- 
fits that it receives, as a percentage of income 
over its entire lifetime. 
The new analysis reveals the following: 
The lifetime net tax rates paid by Americans 
in the baby boom and successive generations 
will likely be much higher than the rates paid 
by those born earlier. 
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The net tax rates paid by future generations 
will be substantially higher than those paid by 
- 
the baby boom and other current generations, 
unless policy actions are taken now to mitigate 
the increase. 
The generational imbalance between newly 
born and future Americans could be largely elirni- 
nated either by imposing a cap on mandatory 
spending (excludmg Social Security) from 1993 
through 2004 or by instituting an appropriate sur- 
tax.  Both policies would significantly raise the net 
taxes paid by current Americans, but the increase 
for the newly born would be considerably more 
under a surtax. 
I.  The Nature 
of  Generational 
Accounts 
The federal budget normally measures receipts 
and outlays for one  year at a time and reports 
these estimates for only a few years into the fu- 
ture. Generational accounts, in contrast, look 
ahead many decades, classifying taxes paid and 
transfers received-such  as Social Security, Medi- 
care, and food stamps-according  to the generation 
that pays or receives the money. For an existing 
clevelandfed.org/research/review.cfmgeneration, taxes  and transfers  are estimated 
year by  year  over members' remaining lifespan. 
These amounts are then summarized in terms of 
one number, the present value of the genexation's 
entire annual series of average future tax payments 
net of transfers received. For future generations, the 
accounts are based on the proposition that the gov- 
ernment's bllls wd have to be paid either by them or 
by those now living. The calculations determine 
how much future Americans will have to pay on 
average to the government, above the amount they 
will receive in transfers, if  total government spend- 
ing is not reduced from its projected path and if 
those now living pay no more than anticipated. 
Defined more precisely, generational accounts 
measure, as of a particular base year, the present 
value of the average future taxes that a member 
of each generation is estimated to pay minus the 
present value of the average future transfers that 
he or she is estimated to receive. This difference 
is called the "net payment" in the following dis- 
cussion. A generation is defined as all males or 
females born in a given year. 
Generational accounts can be used for two 
types of comparison. First, they allow us to com- 
pare the lifetime net payments by future gen- 
erations, by the generation just  born, and by 
different generations born in the past. Lifetime 
net payments by generations born in the past 
are based on estimates of actual taxes paid and 
transfer payments received through 1991, as 
well as on projections of taxes to be paid and 
transfer payments to be received in the future. 
Second, generational accounts can be used to 
compare the effects of actual or proposed policy 
changes on the remaining lifetime net payments 
of currently living and future generations. Such 
comparisons can be made equally well for policies 
that change the totals of receipts or expenditures 
and for those that change the composition of the 
budget without affecting the deficit. 
It should be noted that, as now constructed, 
generational accounts have a number of limita- 
tions. First, they include the taxes and transfers 
of all levels of government-federal,  state, and 
local-and  thus do  not show the separate effect 
of the federal budget as a whole. However, the 
difference in the accounts due to a federal gov- 
ernment policy change can be analyzed alone. 
Second, generational accounts reflect only taxes 
paid and transfers received. They do  not impute 
to part~cular  generations the value of the govem- 
ment's purchases of goods and services for educa- 
tion, hghways, national defense, and so on. Thus, 
the full net benefit or burden that any generation 
receives from government fiscal policy as a whole 
is not totally captured. Still, the accounts can 
reveal the effects of  a policy change that affects 
only taxes and transfers. In the future, it may be 
feasible to impute the value of  certain types of 
government purchases to specific generations. 
Third, generational accounting does not, as 
yet, incorporate any policy feedback on the 
economy's growth and interest rates. Feedback 
effects can be significant, but because they 
generally occur slowly, their impact on the dis- 
counted values used in the accounts may be 
small. Moreover, there is reason to believd that 
they would reinforce the conclusions derived 
here. For example, policies that decrease cur- 
rent generations' net payments while increasing 
the burden on future generations are likely to 
reduce investment over time. This in turn will 
lower real wage growth and raise real interest 
rates, which on balance will harm future genera- 
tions in absolute terms. 
Finally, generational accounting divides people 
born in the same year into only two categories, 
males and females,  with each designated a "gen- 
eration."  This is an important distinction, since the 
sexes differ significantly in such characteristics as 
hfetime earnings and longevity. However, the 
method does not reveal differences with respect 
to other characteristics, such as income levels or 
race, nor does it show the wide diversity among 
individuals within any particular grouping. 
Thus, the results presented here should be 
viewed as experimental and illustrative. They 
are limited by the availability and quality of the 
data, especially for earlier years. In addition, they 
are necessarily based on a number of simpldying 
assumptions (about which reasonable people 
may disagree) concerning the pattern of future 
taxes and spending, mortality and birth rates, the 
interest rate used for discounting future taxes and 
transfers to derive present values, and so forth. 
The absolute amounts of the generational ac- 
counts are sensitive to all of these assumptions. 
Nevertheless,  like the 75-year projections is- 
sued each year by the Social Security trustees, the 
accounts can be illuminating when considered in 
light of their assumptions. Moreover, the most fun- 
damental result-that  future generations' average 
net payment will be relatively much larger than 
that of the generation just born-holds  for a wide 
range of reasonable changes in the assumptions. 
II.  Reniair~ing 
Net Payments by 
Existing Generations 
Tables 1  and 2 show the generational accounts as 
of calendar year 1991 for every fifth generation of 
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males and females alive in that year. The first col-
umn, "Net Payment," is the difference between
the present value of taxes that a member of each
generation will pay, on average, over his or her
remaining lifetime and the present value of
transfers that he or she will receive. The other col-
umns show the average present values of several
different taxes and transfers. All federal, state, and
local taxes and transfers are included in these cal-
culations. Federal spending and receipts are based
on the baseline calculations in the Office of Man-
agement and Budget's Mid-Session Review of the
1993 Budget.
The present value of future taxes to be paid
by young and middle-aged generations far ex-
ceeds the present value of the future transfers they
will receive. For males age 40 in 1991, for exam-
ple, the present value of future taxes is $180,100
more than the present value of future transfers.
The amounts are large because these genera-
tions are close to their peak taxpaying years.
For newborn males, on the other hand, the
present value of the net payment is much
smaller, $78,900, because they will pay very lit-
tle in taxes for a number of years.
Older generations, who are largely retired, will
receive more Social Security, Medicare, and other
future benefits than they will pay in future taxes.
That is, they have negative net payments. Females
have smaller net payments than males, mainly
because they earn less and thus pay less income
and Social Security taxes.
clevelandfed.org/research/review.cfmTABLE 2
Generational Accounts for
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Since the figures in these tables show the
remaining lifetime net payments of particular
generations, they do not include the taxes paid
or transfers received in the past. This must be
kept in mind when considering the net payments
of those now alive. The portion of a generation's
remaining lifetime net payment depends on
whether we are talking about 10-, 40-, or 65-year-
olds. The fact that 40-year-old males can expect to
pay more in the future than they receive, in
present-value terms, while the reverse is true for
65-year-old males, does not necessarily mean that
federal, state, and local governments are treating
the 40-year-olds unfairly. Because 65-year-old
men paid considerable taxes when younger, and
these are not reflected in their remaining lifetime
net payments, direct comparisons are impossible.
The lifetime net payments of different genera-
tions can be compared only by using lifetime net
tax rates, discussed below.
Estimates of future net payments by generation
are affected by the amount of taxes, transfers, and
other government expenditures assumed year by
year in the baseline projection. These assumptions
can differ widely. As explained in the appendix,
the methods of projection generally seek to main-
tain current policy in some sense. However, cur-
rent policy can be interpreted in several ways,
especially for expenditures such as defense. Fur-
thermore, long-term Medicare and Medicaid
projections assume that, eventually, policy actions
or other forces will hold spending growth to the
overall rate of economic expansion (adjusted
for shifts in the age and sex composition of the
clevelandfed.org/research/review.cfmTABLE 3
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SOURCE: Office of Management and Budget (1992).
population), even if the growth rate is quite
rapid for the next few decades.
1
III. Net Payments by
Future Generations
Future generations—those born in 1992 and later
—will be required to make a 111 percent larger
net payment to the government, on average, than
those bom in 1991. The average net payments of
$166,500 by future males and $83,400 by future
females are calculated assuming that the male-to-
female net payment ratio is the same for future
generations as for those born in 1991. The calcula-
tions also assume that all future Americans of a
particular sex will make the same average net pay-
ment over their lifetimes after adjustments are
made for economic growth.
A growth adjustment is needed to compensate
for the fact that future generations will pay more
in taxes, net of transfers received, simply because
their incomes will be higher. To properly assess fu-
ture generations' net payment relative to that of the
newly bom, it is necessary to calculate the net pay-
ment they will make above and beyond the amount
due to economic growth. Generational accounts
assume that all future generations will pay the same
net amount apart from this growth adjustment. The
net amount is the number shown in tables 1 and 2
for all future generations of the same sex.
A generational imbalance, as defined above,
is calculated in such a way that the generations
now alive, including the newly born, do not pay
any more taxes (or receive any less transfers)
than projected in the baseline. This assumption
is an analytical device for determining the size of
the nation's fiscal imbalance; it is not meant to
suggest that future generations will in fact close
the gap all by themselves. Any actual policy
change is almost certain to bear in some degree
on current generations as well as on those yet
to be born. If such a policy change is made, the
percentage difference in net payments between
the newly born and future generations would
be less than shown in tables 1 and 2. Policy
changes of this kind are discussed below.
The size of the imbalance between future
generations and the newly born is sensitive to
assumptions about both the interest rate used
for discounting and the growth rate of the econ-
omy. Table 3 shows the percentage differential
under interest rates of 3-0, 6.0, and 9.0 percent
and productivity growth rates of 0.25, 0.75, and
1.25 percent. Although the difference ranges
from 65 percent to 228 percent, our basic con-
clusion, that future generations' net payment
will be much larger than that of those just born,
still holds in every case.
The generational imbalance also depends on
the policy assumption that all future generations
of the same sex will have the same net payment
(after adjusting for growth). But suppose that the
future generations born between 1992 and 2001
pay only the same amount as those born in
1991- Because these future generations pay less
than previously assumed, those born after 2001
will have a net payment that is 186 percent
larger, rather than 111 percent larger, than that
facing the 1991 generation. The greater the num-
ber of future generations who pay no more
than current newborns, the larger will be the





The estimated 111 percent imbalance in 1991
between newborns and future generations can
be compared with the estimated 79 percent im-
balance in 1990 reported in the fiscal year 1993
budget. The difference primarily reflects lower
baseline receipts projected for 1993-2004.
Based on last year's projections, the estimated
1991 imbalance would be 81 percent. A second
factor is that another generation, the one born
in 1991, does not have to make the higher lifetime
net payments required of future generations.
• 1 A pure extrapolation of recent trends, in contrast, implies that
health care costs will eventually bankrupt the government.
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generations -71.3 -57.2 -33.2 -29-3
Percentage Difference in Net Payment
Future generations
and age zero 11.7 15.1 11.7 15.1
a. $0.05 thousand or less.
SOURCES: Office of Management and Budget (1992) and authors' calculations.
IV. Illustrative
Policy Changes
Table 4 compares two alternative policies aimed
at rectifying the fiscal imbalance between the gen-
eration just born and future generations. Both
would remove the imbalance to about the same
degree, but their distributive effects among differ-
ent generations vary tremendously.
The first of these policies is a cap on all man-
datory spending programs except Social Security
and deposit insurance. From 1993 to 2004, the sav-
ings from the cap would be calculated for each
mandatory program with beneficiaries as the dif-
ference between 1) baseline spending and 2)
spending limited to the growth in the number of
beneficiaries plus the inflation rate (with a little ad-
ditional growth allowed in the first two years for
transition). Medicare and Medicaid are the largest
mandatory programs, and they produce most of
the total savings. For these two programs, spending
would be limited to the amount determined by the
cap. For all other mandatory programs (except So-
cial Security and deposit insurance), the required
savings would be spread across the board as a
proportionate reduction in spending. Employing
the economic assumptions used for the 1993 Mid-
Session Review (and extended to the years after
1997), the consolidated budget is projected to be
balanced under the cap in 2004.
2 Thereafter, the
spending growth rates for mandatory programs
would be the same as in the baseline calculations.
However, because the level of mandatory spending
in 2004 would be lower than under the baseline,
applying these same growth rates would produce
permanently lower levels of subsequent spending.
The cap on mandatory spending would largely
eliminate the imbalance in net payments between
future generations and those just born. Future
generations would pay an average of 12 percent
more, instead of 111 percent more. The net pay-
ment by future males would be $71,300 less than
under the baseline, on average, and the net pay-
ment by future females would be $33,200 less.
All existing generations would face a larger
net payment. In terms of age, the biggest increase
would be for people who are now around 55 to
60. This is because the cap would mainly reduce
transfer payments for health care, especially
Medicare, which is received almost totally by the
elderly. The increase in net payments would be
higher for females than males at almost every
age, because females live longer, and the cap
would primarily reduce transfers to the elderly.
The second policy is a surtax on the federal
individual income tax. From 1993 to 2004, the
amount of the surtax would equal the spending
reduction required by the mandatory cap. After
2004, the surtax would increase at the same rate
as other taxes generally do.
The surtax would reduce the generational im-
balance by almost as much as the mandatory
cap. Future generations would pay 15 percent
more on average than those just born, com-
pared to 12 percent under the cap and 111 per-
cent under the baseline. The average future
male would pay $57,200 less, and the average
future female would pay $29,300 less. All exist-
ing generations would pay more.
The distributional effect of the surtax would
be quite different from that of the mandatory
cap, however. The surtax would bear much
• 2 The budget would not necessarily be balanced in all later years.
Generational balance over a period taken as a whole is consistent with
some years of deficit, and the illustrative policies do not entirely eliminate
the imbalance.
clevelandfed.org/research/review.cfmTABLE 5
Lifetime Net Tax Rates, Gross





















































































































































more on the relatively young; the cap, on the
relatively old. For example, a 65-year-old male
would pay $3,100 more under the surtax than
under the baseline, but $20,000 more under the
cap; in contrast, a 20-year-old male would pay
$26,100 more under the surtax but $11,100 more
under the cap. This is because the surtax is paid
disproportionately by younger people earning
income, whereas the cap disproportionately re-
duces transfer payments to the elderly.
The second distributional difference is be-
tween males and females. The surtax bears more
on males; the cap, on females. This is primarily
due to the fact that males tend to have higher in-
comes and pay more income taxes, whereas fe-
males tend to live longer and receive more
health care transfers.
The two policies also have different distribu-
tional effects between existing and future gener-
ations. The reduction in net payments by future
generations is less under the surtax: $14,000 less
for males, on average, and $4,000 less for fe-
males. This is partly because a larger imbalance
remains between future generations and those
just born, 15 percent compared to 12 percent.
The improvement for future generations is less
under the surtax because older generations do
not pay as much more.
V. Historical
Lifetime Tax Rates
The analysis so far has been prospective, consid-
ering only the present value of future taxes and
transfers as of 1991 for existing generations and
those yet to be born. A prospective analysis can
compare policy changes, and it can compare the
lifetime fiscal burdens on the newly born and fu-
ture generations, since their entire lifetimes are
yet to come. However, it cannot compare the
lifetime fiscal burden of one existing generation
with that of another existing generation born in
a different year—or with future generations—
because part of any living generation's taxes and
transfers occurred in the past and thus are not
taken into account.
A comparison of one existing generation with
another must be based on their entire lifetime
taxes and transfers. Table 5 shows the results in
terms of lifetime net tax rates for different genera-
tions born since 1900 and for future generations.
The lifetime net tax rate of a generation is defined
as the present value of its lifetime net taxes (taxes
less transfers) divided by the present value of its
lifetime income. The present values are calculated
as of the generation's year of birth, so that each
cohort can be compared from the standpoint of
when it was born. The lifetime net taxes are the
clevelandfed.org/research/review.cfmsame as the generational account for a genera-
tion in the year of its birth. (As shown in table 1,
the lifetime net taxes of males born in 1991 are
$78,900.) Since lifetime taxes, transfers, and in-
come have trended upward and have fluctuated
to some extent, it is more appropriate to com-
pare the relative fiscal burden on different gen-
erations in terms of lifetime net tax rates than in
terms of absolute amounts.
Lifetime net tax rates are calculated from his-
torical data on taxes, transfers, and income up
to 1991 and from projections of future data as
described in the previous sections. Historical
data, however, are not available in the same
detail as the figures for recent years underlying
our projections, and in some cases they are not
available at all. The appendix summarizes the
methods used to construct the historical series.
Lifetime calculations also introduce a number
of conceptual issues. For example, how should
lifetime income be measured? Lifetime income is
defined as a present value, like lifetime taxes and
transfers. Therefore, the present-value calcula-
tions should include all income that increases a
generation's resources: labor earnings, inherited
wealth, and capital gains over and above the
normal return to saving. The normal return to
saving is not itself included in income, because
that would be double counting. Saving and
earning a normal rate of return do not increase
the present value of a household's resources.
Data do not exist on the share of each genera-
tion's income stemming from inherited wealth
or supernormal capital gains, so labor earnings
are used to represent income.
3
The lifetime net tax rate for males in the base
case exhibits a strong upward trend, rising from
17.8 percent in 1990 to about 34 percent in 1970
and succeeding years. The lifetime net tax rate
for females exhibits a quite different pattern. It
started much higher than for males, at 35.3 per-
cent, declined irregularly for half a century, and
rose slightly thereafter. Since 1950, the net tax
rate has been about the same for both sexes.
The pattern of the female net tax rate is an
artifact of women's increasing labor force partic-
ipation and the method used to attribute labor
earnings and taxes within a family. Labor earn-
ings are attributed to the person who receives
them; some taxes, including excises, are attrib-
uted equally to husband and wife. The lower
female earnings thus contribute to a higher fe-
male tax rate, especially in the early decades of
• 3 The error due to this omission is relatively small in the aggregate,
given that labor income has long accounted tor three-fourths of all income
and that only part of the remaining income from capital should be included.
However, the errors for different generations could vary, depending on
trends and fluctuations in asset values and bequest behavior.
the century. At the same time, the rise in female
labor force participation over time has caused
their earnings to increase faster than male earn-
ings, without directly increasing those taxes that
are attributed equally to husband and wife. This
has offset the general increase in taxes that con-
tributed to the rising net tax rates observed in
the series for males.
This pattern emphasizes a conceptual question
in calculating the generational accounts. How
should income, taxes, and transfers be attributed
within a family? Excise taxes could alternatively
have been attributed in proportion to labor earn-
ings, or labor earnings could have been attrib-
uted equally between husband and wife. Table
5 displays one answer to this question by includ-
ing lifetime net tax rates for males and females
combined, calculated as a weighted average of
the net tax rate for each sex. Note that the aver-
age net tax rises significantly over most of this
century, increasing from 21.5 percent for the gen-
eration born in 1900, to 32.1 percent for the gen-
eration born in I960, to about 33 percent for the
generations born since 1970. This trend reflects
the growing fiscal role of government. The aver-
age net tax rate for future generations is 71.1
percent, which is the same percentage differ-
ence relative to people newly born in 1991 as
that shown in tables 1 and 2. The male and
female net tax rates are virtually identical for fu-
ture generations.
Table 5 also breaks down the net tax rates
between gross tax rates and transfer rates. To
calculate the latter, the present value of a gener-
ation's lifetime taxes (or transfers) is divided by
the present value of its lifetime income. This
breakdown reveals the expanded role of gov-
ernment transfer payments during the past cen-
tury. The lifetime transfer rate for males and
females taken together nearly quadrupled be-
tween the generations born in 1900 and those
born in 1991, starting at 3-3 percent and rising
each decade to a rate of 12.2 percent. The in-
crease was more rapid, in both relative and ab-
solute terms, for the generations born before
World War II than afterward.
Because of the growth in the transfer rate, the
gross tax rate has not leveled off in the past two
decades to the same extent as the net tax rate.
The gross tax rate for males and females combined
nearly doubled between the generations born in
1900 and 1991, starting at 24.8 percent and in-
creasing each decade to a rate of 45.8 percent.
A generation's lifetime taxes pay for the govern-
ment's purchases of goods and services as well
as for public transfers to its own members and
other generations.
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The breakdown further shows that the simi-
larity between males and females in lifetime net
tax rates masks very different gross tax and
transfer rates. Each rate is much higher for fe-
males, reflecting such factors as their lower life-
time income and greater longevity (as well as
the attribution assumptions for taxes and income
within the family).
Table 6 shows how policy changes designed
to rectify the generational imbalance would
affect the lifetime net tax rates of different gener-
ations. For future generations, the cap on man-
datory spending reduces the average lifetime
net tax rate on males and females together from
71.1 percent to 41.3 percent, while the surtax
reduces it to 46.5 percent.
For existing generations, the effect of policy
changes on lifetime net tax rates increases as
the generation's age declines, and for the very
youngest cohort, born in 1991, the change is
quite significant. Under the mandatory cap, this
generation's lifetime net tax rate increases by
2.7 percentage points for males. For females,
who will live longer, the increase is 4.5 percent-
age points. A surtax would raise the burden on
the youngest group still more: an increase over
the baseline of 6.9 percentage points for males
and 6.3 percentage points for females. For older
generations, the increase in the lifetime net tax
rate is smaller, primarily because the absolute ef-
fects of the policy change are discounted over
more years in order to calculate the present value
as of the generation's year of birth. In the case
of the surtax, the absolute effects are also
smaller for older generations, because they
have fewer remaining years of labor earnings.
The burden that remains on the older genera-
tions is greater under the mandatory cap than
under the surtax, as previously explained, be-
cause Medicare benefits are relatively high and
income taxes relatively low during their remain-
ing years. Since females live longer than males,
the increase in their lifetime net tax rate under
the mandatory cap is greater than for males at
every age. On the other hand, because males
have higher labor earnings, the surtax generally







Generational accounting is based on the present-
value budget constraint of the government sector.
In simple terms, this constraint says that the gov-
ernment must ultimately pay for its purchases of
goods and services either with resources it
obtains from current and future generations or
with its current assets (net of debt). If current
clevelandfed.org/research/review.cfmgenerations pay less in taxes (net of transfers
received) to finance government purchases,
future generations will have to pay more. For
example, suppose that, through borrowing, pay-
ments for the government's bills were repeatedly
shifted to future generations by each successive
current generation. Then this debt would grow,
with interest. Eventually, the interest would ex-
ceed the lifetime income of future generations,
resulting in default.
More precisely, the government's present-
value constraint means that, at any point in time,
the present value of the government's future pur-
chases of goods and services cannot exceed the
sum of three items: 1) the present value of future
taxes to be paid (net of transfers received) by
existing generations (that is, the sum of their
generational accounts multiplied by the number of
people in each generation), 2) the present value
of taxes to be paid (net of transfers received) by
future generations, and 3) the value of government
assets that yield income, less the government debt.
Generational accounting estimates the present
value of the government's purchases of goods and
services plus amounts 1 and 3- Amount 2, the pres-
ent value of taxes to be paid by all future genera-
tions (net of transfers received), is calculated as the
present value of future government purchases
minus amounts 1 and 3-
The generational accounts for future genera-
tions are derived from the aggregate amount 2.
For all but one of the policy experiments dis-
cussed here, different net payments (after adjust-
ing for economic growth) are not estimated for
different future generations. Rather, the aggregate
present-value net payment by future generations
is divided on an even basis among all future gen-
erations so that the average net payment by the
members of each keeps pace with the economy's
productivity growth. Thus, as shown in tables 1
and 2, one single (growth-adjusted) average figure
stands as the generational account for all future
generations of a given sex. Because the genera-
tional account is calculated indirectly from the
above aggregates, it can be shown only as a single




Calculating the generational accounts is a three-
step process. The first step entails projecting
each currently living generation's average taxes
and transfers for each future year in which at
least some of its members will be alive. The
second step converts these projected values into an
actuarial present value, using assumptions for the
discount rate and the probability that the generation's
members will be alive in each of the future years.
The sum of these present values, with transfers sub-
tracted from taxes, is the generational account, or net
payment, for existing generations shown in the first
column of tables 1 and 2. The third step estimates
the other terms of the present-value constraint (ex-
plained in the previous section) so as to derive the
average net payment by future generations. The cal-
culations are based on projections to the year 2200.
Projection of taxes and transfers. The projec-
tion of average future taxes and transfers begins
with the national totals of all federal, state, and
local taxes and transfers as reported in the Na-
tional Income and Product Accounts (NIPAs) for
calendar year 1991. (All years in this article are
calendar years unless otherwise stated.) Employee
retirement and veterans' benefits paid by the gov-
ernment are considered a form of employee com-
pensation and are classified as the purchase of a
service rather than as a transfer payment.
The base-year NIPA totals are distributed to all
existing generations, as defined by age and sex,
based on the corresponding distributions in cross-
section survey data. These surveys include the Sur-
vey of Income and Program Participation and the
Current Population Survey, both by the Bureau of
the Census, and the Survey of Consumer Expendi-
tures by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Those taxes
that are not directly paid by individuals and so do
not appear in these surveys, such as the corpo-
rate income tax, are allocated. Because genera-
tional accounting attributes taxes and transfers
to individuals, household taxes and transfers
are attributed to household members. No spe-
cial imputations are made to children, but the
cross-section surveys impute some consumption
to them; thus, the taxes on that consumption are
attributed to children. The attribution rules affect
the values of the baseline accounts, but are not
likely to alter the generational implications of
policy changes.
The distribution of average future taxes and
transfers by age and sex is assumed to equal the
base-year average amounts after adjustments for
growth and projected policy. In the case of federal
taxes and transfers for 1993-2004, the amounts
correspond to the current service estimates of
taxes and transfers in the Mid-Session Review of
the 1993 Budget (July 1992), extended beyond
1997 and updated for the actual fiscal year 1992
results. In the case of state and local taxes and
transfers for 1993-2004, the amounts are based on
the GDP assumptions in the Mid-Session Review
as well as on the assumption that the ratios of
clevelandfed.org/research/review.cfmstate and local tax and transfer aggregates to
GDP remain constant at 1991 levels. After 2004,
the average taxes and transfers by age and sex
are assumed, with two exceptions, to increase
at the assumed rate of productivity growth. Pro-
ductivity (both labor and multifactor) is assumed
to increase by 0.75 percent a year, which is close
to the average annual rate of multifactor produc-
tivity growth since 1970.
Social Security and health care transfers are the
two exceptions. Projected Social Security transfers
and payroll tax receipts after 2004 are based on
special calculations made by the Social Security
Administration assuming a productivity growth
rate of 0.75 percent. Projected Medicare and Medi-
caid transfers from 2005 through 2030 are calculated
from the growth rates in the Health Care Financing
Administration's middle-scenario estimates published
inl991
4 After 2030, health care transfers are as-
sumed to stabilize as a percentage of GDP apart from
the effect of changes in the composition of the popu-
lation by age and sex. Medicare receipts are assumed
to grow at 0.75 percent a year.
Assumptionsfor present value. The appropriate
discount rate for calculating the present value of
future amounts depends on whether these
amounts are known with certainty. Future govern-
ment receipts and expenditures are risky, which
suggests that they should be discounted by a rate
higher than the real rate of interest on government
securities. On the other hand, government receipts
and expenditures appear to be less volatile than
the real return on capital, which suggests that
they should be discounted by a rate lower than
that. The baseline calculations assume a 6 per-
cent real discount rate, which is intermediate
between the roughly 2 percent average real
return available in recent years on short-term
Treasury securities and the roughly 10 percent
real return available on capital.
The present values of future average taxes
and transfers are also discounted for mortality
probabilities in order to derive actuarial present
values. The demographic probabilities through
2066 are those embedded in the Social Security
trustees' intermediate projection in 1992 (alter-
native II) of the population by age and sex. The
fertility, mortality, and immigration probabilities
in 2066 were used for later years. Immigration is
treated as equivalent to a change in mortality.
Other projections. Federal purchases of goods
and services through 2004, like federal taxes and
transfers, are from the latest Mid-Session Review
extended beyond 1997 and updated for the actual
fiscal year 1992 results. State and local purchases
through 2004 are kept at the same ratio to GDP as
in 1991. Federal, state, and local purchases after
2004 are divided between 1) those made on
behalf of specific age groups—the young,
middle-aged, and elderly—such as educational
expenditures, and 2) those that are more nearly
pure public goods, such as defense and public
safety. Purchases per person in each of the
three age groups, and purchases of public
goods per capita, all increase at the assumed
rate of productivity growth.
The economic value of the government assets
that yield income, less the government debt, is es-
timated to be the cumulative amount of the NIP A
deficit since 1900 converted to constant dollars by
the GDP deflator.
The average growth-adjusted net payment to
be made by future generations is determined
using the aggregate present value of the net pay-
ment (as derived through the present-value bud-
get constraint), the assumed productivity growth,
and the projected size of future generations. The
size of future generations is estimated using the
Social Security alternative II projection through
2066 and the demographic assumptions for 2066
for later years.
Historical lifetime net tax rates. Lifetime net
tax rates for generations born between 1900 and
1991 are calculated by dividing the generational
account of each generation at birth by its human
wealth—the present value at birth of its future labor
earnings. Calculating a generation's human wealth
requires knowing its average labor earnings in each
future year. The average labor earnings received by
particular generations in particular years are deter-
mined by distributing aggregate labor income by
age and sex using cross-section distributions of
labor income found in cross-section survey data.
The lifetime generational accounts for generations
born between 1900 and 1991 are based on actual
taxes and transfers between 1900 and 1991 and on
projected taxes and transfers in the years thereafter.
Aggregate labor earnings, taxes, and transfers
were obtained from the NIPAs for 1929 and later
years. Pre-1929 aggregate labor earnings are from
Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial
Times to 1970. Pre-1929 taxes and transfers are from
the 1982 Census of Governments, Historical Statis-
tics on Government Finances and Employment.
Various cross-section surveys are used to distribute
aggregate labor earnings, taxes, and transfers by age
and sex. Cross-section surveys prior to the early
1960s were not available for this study, so surveys
from years after I960 are used for earlier years. The
Current Population Surveys are used for labor earn-
ings and taxes on labor earnings in 1964 and later
years, and the 1964 survey is used for earlier years.
4. This scenario is discussed in Sonnefeld et al. (1991).
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